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IN THE SUPR-EME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ECHO NEY, TRUSTEE,
WASATCH HOMES, INC.,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No.
8437

G. T. HARRISON and
ALDA J. HARRISON,
Defendants and Respondents.

Appellant's Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action to recover a real estate commission. The claim was assigned to the plaintiff, Echo N ey.
Wasatch Homes, Inc., a real estate broker's firm, obtained purchasers for the Snow Apartments, an apartment house owned by Aida J. Harrison and G. T. Harrison, the defendants herein. No listing agreement was
signed; however, an earnest money receipt and agree1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ment admitted as Exhibit P-1 was executed, providing
for the payment of a commission and for the payment
of a reasonable attonwy 's fee in the event of a breach
of the contract. The sellers and buyers performed the
earnest money agreement, except that the sellers refused
to pay the real estate commission provided for in said
agreement. rrhe sale ·was consummated and transfer of
title made to the buyers.
The district court ruled that the plaintiff could not
reeover beeause there was no listing agreement ever
executed between the sellers and the real estate broker
and, therefore, there existed no contract upon which the
broker could recover. A judgment by default was
obtained against Aida J. Harrison on December 9, 1953.
On September 21, 1954 a notice of the judgment and
demand for payment was sent to .Mrs. Harrison, and she
replied by letter refusing t9 pay the judgment and
stating that she would ignore any further efforts to
collect the judgment. (See Ex. 3-P.)
On the 30th day of October Aida J. Harrison filed
a motion to set aside the judgment, and said motion was
granted solely upon the affidaYit on file in this case.
From the order setting a~ide the judgment against
Aida J. Harrison, and from the final judgment of the
trial court, the appellant appeals.
POINT I.
rrHE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE
rrHE JUDGMENT AG.AINST THE DEFENDANT,
j\LD,\ J. HARRISON.
rrlw defendant, Aida J. Harrison, was duly served
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with the summons and complaint in this action on the
12th day of November, 1953 (R. 8). This defendant did
not answer the complaint, and on December 9, 1953
judgment by default was granted against this defendant
(Tr. P. 4). A demand for payment of this judgment
was received by the defendant on September 21, 1954
and the defendant replied by letter dated September 26,
1954 (See Ex. 3-P). In this letter the defendant stated:
"I am taking no action whatever in regard to
it, so please don't bother me any more about it,
as I am a very busy woman and would ignore any
more efforts on your part to collect from me.''
On the 25th day of October, 1954 a garnishment was
issued against First Security Bank, and on October 28,
1954 the garnishee replied that it owed this defendant
$2,608.97.
On October 30, 1954 the defendant filed a motion to
set aside the judgment. r_rhis motion was supported
solely by the affidavit of Alda J. Harrison pleading that
she had failed to plead in the action because she felt
that she was protected by a divorce decree directing her
husband to pay the commission on the sale of the Snow
Apartments and therefore had no liability (R. 16). No
other evidence or justification for relief from the judgment was offered by the moving party. The trial court
granted the motion and set aside the plaintiff's judgment
solely on the strength of this affidavit.
These facts present the narrow question of whether
or not a belief on the part of a defendant served with
process that he has no liability at law to the plaintiff,
or that he has a good defense to the action is a justifica-
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tion for not pleading to the complaint.
At common law all judgments become final after
the close of term. Our rule 60(b) is in derogation of
this rule. In Bickerstaff &s. Harmonica Fire Insuraucr
Co., 133 S.W. (2d) 890 the court analyzed the effect of
60 (b) and said:
''The statute to vacate judgments by this pro('ecdiug is in derogation, not only of the common
law, but of the very important policy of holding
judgmentH final after the close of the term. Citizens must lwce confidence in the judgments of our
official tribunals, as settlements of their controversies ; and then· should be some end to them.
Unless the case be clearly within the spirit and
polic·y of the act, the judgment should not be
disturbed.
Hule 60 (b) is intended to grant relief in certain
cases from judgments that would have become unassailable at common la'x.'. Does the affidavit of the defendant,
.._\lda Harrison, which was the sole basis for setting aside
the judgment come 'vi thin the provisions of Rule 60(b) 1
r:rhe affidavit sets forth two reasons why the court should
set aside the judgment again~t her:
1. She believed that she was not liable to the
plaintiff.

2. No notice of judgment was given her.
The second basis is entirely without foundation. No
notice of judgment is required in the district court and
the defendant was not entitled to any notice. However,
in this instance she was sent a notice of judgment to
which she replied that she intended to take no action
whatevl'l' iu regard to the judgment and would not be
4
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bothered any rnore about it (See Ex. 3-P). ~J:lhis was in
reply to a letter notifying her of the judgment on September 21. Her motion to set aside the judgment was
not made until October 30.
The only other ground in her affidavit is based upon
the mistaken notion that her divorce decree had absolved
her of all liability for the real estate commission. She
refused to consult eounsel, saying:
''I would not bother my lawyer about it, nor
will I pay any part of the commission.'' (Ex. P -3).
Is this a reason that justifies relief from a judgment ?
Does the law permit a person who so scorns the process
of the court and refnsc•s to ''bother'' her law~-er with
process duly served upon her, to eome into court vdth
no more showing than this affidavit and set aside a
judgment entered against her nearly one year before'?
The cases all deny such a right. The courts even deny
relief where the fault is the attorney's and not the
person served.
In all of the following California cases, the trial
court set aside default judgments and the appellate
court held the trial court abused its discretion in so
doing and reinstated the judgments. In Sharmwn L'S.
Jorgensen, 39 P. 863, the attorney thought he had filed
the answer, but inadvertently failed to do so. In Durbow
vs. Chesley, 141 P. 631, the defendant attorney failed to
file an appearance due to a mistaken understanding that
the case was consolidated with other actions. In Ross vs.
San Diego Glazed Pipe Co., 194 P. 1059, attorney forgot
to answer counterclaim.
5
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In Coleman vs. Rankin, 37 Calif. 247, the defendant
lost the summons and failed to answer it on time. The
court refused to set aside the default judgment. In
T~V einuerger vs. Cummings, 123 P. (2d) 531 the court in
refusing to set aside a default judgment said:
''All persons in possession of their normal
faculties, capable of engaging in business transactions, must conform with, and be guided by, the
rules and regulations of legal procedure.''
The controlling Utah cases concur in the rulings of
the California courts. In Peterson vs. Crosier, 29 Utah
2:1;); 81 P. 860 the court held that a default judgment
would not be set aside because of mere carelessness, lack
of attention, or indifference on the part of. the defendant
or her attorney. ~Irs. Harrison not only scorned the
servic<' of process and refused to even ''bother'' her
attorney, but ignored the notice sent her of the judgment
entered against her. In the Crosier case the court denied
the defendant's motion to set aside the judgment on the
ground that his attorneys neglected to appear. The
court said:
''The moving party must show that he used
due diligence to prepare and appear for trial and
was prevented from doing so because of some
accident, misfortune, or combination of circum·
stances over "·hich he had no control. If, however, the record discloses mere carelessness, lack
of attention, or indifference to his rights on the
part of the applicant or his counsel, he cannot
expect an opportunity to redeem his past." Peterson vs. Crosier, 81 P. 860, 862.
In the ease of J1Jc1Yhirter z·s. Donaldson, 36 Utah
293, 104 P. 731 the court affirmed and expounded this
6
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rule denying relief. It is hard to conceive of a fact situation which impels the denial of relief more than the case
of Alda J. I-Iarrison. There is no mistake or excusable
mistake. She simply scorned the process and refused
to "bother" her lawyer. Surely if the error or neglect
of an attorney resulting in a judgment against an innocent person is not grounds for relief, the refusal to even
consult an attorney or answer a complaint is not a
ground for relief.
In Warren vs. Dixon Ra;nch Co., 29 Utah 235; 260
P. (2d) 741, the court refused to set aside a default judgment resulting from the company's process agent's
neglect in failing to notify the company of the service
of the summons. The court said: '' ... the movant must
show that he has used due diligence and that he was
prevented from appearing by circumstances over which
he had no control" ( P. 743). Certainly there were no
circumstances preventing Alda J. Harrison from
"bothering" her lawyer or answering the process. If a
plaintiff can be deprived of a judgment on these facts,
then no plaintiff can rely on a default judgment obtained
from our courts and every person is free to ignore
process with safety.
The lower court's order setting aside the judgment
obtained against Alda J. Harrison should be reversed
and the judgment reinstated.
POINT II.
'rHE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE
WAS NO CONTRACT BETWEEN WASATCH
HO~IES, INC. AND THE DEFENDANTS.

7
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The court in announcing its judgment in this case
ruled against the plaintiff on the sole ground that since
there was no listing agreement between the real estate
broker and the defendants, there was never a contractual
relationship between them which could support recovery.
The testimony of the defendants themselves firmly
establishes the plaintiff's case. -:\Irs. Harrison testified
as follows:
l\lrs. Harrison asked the real estate company to
sell the Snow Apartments for her.
1.

"Q. Who did you ask if they would help youf
''A. This Wasatch Homes ; I think they call
it 'Wasatch.'
"Q. That ::\lr. Dean Parry~
"A. Yes." (R. 22)
2. :Mrs. Harrison signed the earnest money receipt
and agreement (Ex. 1) twice after being signed by all
parties to the receipt and agreement. It contained all
the writing at the time she signed that is no-w upon it.

"Q. In any eYent, all the writing above your
signature was on the paper at the time you signed
here beneath the name of G. T. Harrison~
"A. \Yell, as far as I know." (R. 25)
3. :Mrs. Harrison went to the offices of \Yasatch
Homes, Inc., the real estate broker, and executed the
final papers in accordance with the terms of the earnest
mone~· receipt and agreement, and accepted payment
from the buyers.

'' Q. ~Irs. Harrison, after Exhibit 1 was
sig1wd, you came to the offices of \Yasatch Homes
for the purpose of signing the final documents,
8
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didn't you, and your husband refused to come;
is that correct 1
"A. Yes, I think that was correct." (R. 26)
'' Q. And you remember meeting with l\IIr. and
Mrs. Asp and going over the closing?
''A. Yes.
'' Q. -and signing the final papers~
''A. Yes.
'' Q. -the final contract of sale; don't you f
Don't you remember that?
''A. Yes, I think I remember that. '' ( R. 27)

1Ir. Harrison's testimony also establishes the plaintiff's case.
When the earnest money receipt and agreement
was signed by G. T. Harrison, the agreement was signed
by Dean Parry for Wasatch Homes.
1.

'' Q. Was there anything else that wasn't on
there when you signed it~
''A. Yes.
"Q. What is that?
''A. Let me see - well, I think it is sub- ,
stantially the same otherwise." (R. 77)
2. G. T. Harrison himself wrote in the clause on
the earnest money agreement, agreeing to the commission and specifying the amount to be paid the real estate
broker.
3. G. T. Harrison executed the final papers closing
the sale with the buyers supplied by the real estate
company. (R. 87) (R. 90)
The plaintiff submits that the earnest money agree9
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ment (Ex. 1) is a sufficient memorandum to take the
transaction out of the Statute of Frauds. It is a complete
written agreement between the buyer, seller, and real
estate broker. The broker is entitled to recover the commission and a reasonable attorney's fee in accordance
with the terms of the agreement.
CONCLUSIOK
The judgment of the lower court should be reversed.
rrhe judgment against the defendant, Alda J. Harrison,
should be reinstated and judgment entered against G. T.
Harrison. The lower court should be directed to assess
a reasonable attorney's fee against the defendant, G. T.
Harrison.
Respectfully submitted,

GORDOX I. HYDE,
Counsel for Plaintiff and
Appellant
863 First Security Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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